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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of  the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.COMMODITIES UNDER NEOLIBERALISM:
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Abstract
The paper examines the case of cocoa as an illustration of the problems
faced by primary commodity producers. The impact of market
liberalization in cocoa producing countries as well as consuming
industrial countries on the cocoa price and cocoa farmers is examined.
The paper shows that the market liberalization cannot be held responsible
for such improvements in productive efficiency as occurred over time,
which was one of the two stated goals of these measure. Nor is there
convincing evidence that the producer￿s share in the export price
increased, which was the other goal. A serious consequence of the
preoccupation with market liberalization, however, was that it diverted
attention from the main concerns of cocoa producers, viz., the market
volatility, low prices, and the declining producers￿ share in the value
chain. The paper then goes on to explore the kinds of action that might
be considered to address these issues. It makes a case for filling the
institutional vacuum that has been created as a result of the abolition of
state marketing authorities in several cocoa producing countries. The
paper attempts to show that the conditions are favourable for cocoa
producers to coordinate their production policies in order to maintain
satisfactory cocoa prices, which is needed to arrest the erosion of incomes
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prominently in the discussions on international trade,
financial, and development issues. Already in the
early 1940s, Keynes, in conceptualising what were
to emerge as the twin Bretton Woods institutions,
devoted a great deal of thought to the commodity
issue and its close links with international financial
stability (Keynes, 1943). He laboured in the shadow
of the Great Depression, when commodity prices
plummeted to depths not seen before, and worries
over commodity shortages during and after the World
War.
At that time, the commodity problem ￿ the vola-
tility and unreliability of commodity markets ￿ was
of concern to industrial as much as to developing
countries. The disjuncture of interest in commodi-
ties came later, as the former succeeded in reducing
their dependency on commodity imports with the
development of synthetic substitutes and other means
and by putting in place a formidable structure of
agriculture protection,1 even as, for a large part of
the developing world, commodities continued as the
main providers of livelihood and foreign exchange.
Thus, the interest in international solutions to
the commodity problem on the part of the industrial
countries waned over time, turning into virtual hos-
tility to global cooperative actions under the sway
of the neoliberal ideas. International commodity
agreements, buffer stock schemes, and other state
interventions are now widely held as failures, never
to be repeated again.
But the commodity problem remains. It afflicts
particularly the poorest countries, threatening their
livelihood and jeopardising their national economic
management through strains on government budg-
ets and exchange earnings. There is a reluctance to
take up the subject of commodities and explore pos-
sible solutions in the world forums concerned with
issues of trade and finance. Jacques Chirac has called
it ￿a sort of conspiracy of silence￿.2 While the world
development community, rightly, worries about the
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external debt burden on the very poor countries, it
gives little thought to what is arguably the other half
of the problem.
This paper aims to contribute to the current ef-
forts launched by several NGOs and others to bring
back the issue of commodities into the world trade,
finance, and development agenda. It examines the
case of cocoa, a commodity that remains important
as a source of income and foreign exchange earn-
ings for several developing countries and that has
been subjected to market liberalization at both do-
mestic and international levels. It will be seen that
cocoa captures rather well some of the principal ge-
neric issues that face primary commodities, and
therefore offers insights into the kind of actions that
might be considered to address the commodity prob-
lem.
The paper is organised as follows. The first
section describes the structure of the cocoa market
and identifies the factors that are deemed to explain
price formation. This provides the necessary back-
ground to the discussion on the impact of neoliberal
policies on cocoa producers, a matter that is ad-
dressed in Section II. Section III then addresses the
generic issues and explores the remedies that might
be considered in the light of past experience. The
last section offers conclusions.
I. The cocoa market and price
formation
There are basically three generic issues that
arise in the context of primary commodities: the
world market volatility, the declining trend in com-
modity prices, and the relatively small share of
primary producers in the ￿value chain￿.3 They arise
out of the way primary commodity markets are struc-
tured, function, and behave. Since at the core of the
commodity problem is the struggle for bringing
world supplies and demand into balance in the short
as well as long-term, who produces what and at what
cost is central to its resolution.
A. Cocoa production
Cocoa is among the more important commodi-
ties exported by developing countries, with a world
total of about $2.5 billion in recent years. Although
the plant came originally from the Americas, the
principal producers of cocoa, since its rise as a ma-
jor export over the past century, have been in West
Africa. Four countries ￿ C￿te d￿Ivoire, Ghana, Ni-
geria, and Cameroon ￿ account for about two-thirds
of world production, and three-quarters of world
exports of cocoa beans (chart 1). Starting virtually
from nothing, Indonesia ranks today as the second
highest producer, just slightly above Ghana, once
the world￿s largest producer. Other major producers
are Brazil and Malaysia, accounting together for a
little more than 10 per cent of world output.
Cocoa producers are a rather diverse group.
Brazil and Malaysia are relatively high-income
developing countries, while Ghana, Nigeria, and In-
donesia are among the lower-income countries. C￿te
d￿Ivoire and Cameroon fall somewhere in the mid-
dle. Four countries ￿ Cameroon, C￿te d￿Ivoire,
Ghana, and Malaysia ￿ have rather small populations,
ranging between 10￿20 million, while the other three
major producers have populations falling within the
range of 100￿200 million. For the four largest econo-
mies (due to their relatively high per capita income
or large population), cocoa is a rather insignificant
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earnings. For these countries, cocoa exports amount
to less than one per cent of the total export earnings.
On the other hand, for C￿te d￿Ivoire and Ghana, more
than 30 per cent and 25 per cent of the total earn-
ings, respectively, comes from cocoa exports. Thus,
what happens in the world cocoa market is of
critical interest to these two countries, and the de-
velopments in these two countries have a great
impact on the world market.
The structure of production ￿ how production
is organized ￿ also differs among countries. While
production in West Africa is heavily concentrated in
very small farms, cocoa farms in Brazil tend to be
bigger (ranging between 10 to 100 hectares), while
Malaysia has mostly large estates. Indonesia con-
tains both large plantations (some privately owned,
some owned by state) and smallholder producers,
though the share of the former has declined from
some 80 per cent to about 20 per cent of the output
in the last two decades (Bedford et al., 2001).
There are significant differences between the
two modes of production. Large estates (especially
those privately-owned) are run rather like commer-
cial firms, i.e., profitability is given much greater
weight in production decisions. For smallholders,
profits do not have a clear meaning since they also
provide labour. Large estates are therefore less wed-
ded to producing cocoa and are more prepared to
withdraw when market conditions turn unfavourable.
Their large size and financial resources make them
better able to adopt high-yield varieties and new tech-
nologies and business practices, with the result that
overall yields on estates tend to be considerably
higher. But this advantage is offset by the fact that
cocoa is quintessentially a smallholder crop that re-
quires high labour input to harvest and dry the crop.
Thus, in terms of production costs, smallholder pro-
ducers have considerable advantage over the larger
estates (Ruf and de Milly, 1990).
The 1990s witnessed a sharp slowdown in over-
all production of cocoa, mainly as a result of the
declines in Malaysia and Brazil. Ghana and, to a
much smaller extent, Cameroon were the only ma-
jor producers where production rose faster than in
the decade before (table 1). Although Indonesia￿s
rate of expansion also slowed (which was to be ex-
pected, considering the very small base from where
it started), its production nevertheless continued to
expand at what is an astounding rate of 13 per cent a
year.
Table 2 gives the data on yields relative to the
overall average in each of the leading cocoa produc-
ing countries. In this respect, the West African
countries and Brazil lag far behind the two Asian
producers, Malaysia and Indonesia. C￿te d￿Ivoire
Table 1
GROWTH RATES OF PRODUCTION
AND AREA HARVESTED
(Annual trend rates of growth, per cent)
Area
Production harvested
Country 1980￿1989 1990￿1999 1990￿1999
Brazil 1.9 -2.8 -0.1
Cameroon 1.7 2.2 0.6
C￿te d￿Ivoire 8.8 6.7 5.2
Ghana 0.8 5.7 8.3
Indonesia 28.4 12.8 7.7
Malaysia 23.8 -12.4 -14.2
Nigeria 4.5 1.0 2.1
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and Indonesia realised output expansion through a
combination of expansion of the area harvested and
improved yields, while yields in Ghana declined.
The relative position of Brazil, Ghana, and Nigeria
deteriorated over time, while C￿te d￿Ivoire and
Cameroon registered an improvement. Brazil￿s yields
and overall output suffered from ￿witches￿ broom￿,
a plant disease. In the case of Ghana, Nigeria, and
Cameroon, the main reason for low yields is the
dominance (50 per cent or higher) of old trees of
30 years or higher age.
The availability of a suitable natural envi-
ronment is critical to future expansion of cocoa.
According to an International Cocoa Organization
(ICCO) study, soil and climate conditions were con-
sidered particularly favourable for cocoa production
in Malaysia and Indonesia, though they are unable
to dry the harvest naturally, which makes the cocoa
acidic (Ruf and de Milly, 1990). Because of this and
the fact that their output is of uneven size and high
shell content, the market price for the East Asian
cocoa is discounted. Conditions in the other produc-
ing countries were held to range from average to
good. Without threatening the virgin rainforests, land
availability for cocoa farming is modest in the case
of Brazil, Nigeria, and C￿te d￿Ivoire. Malaysia, as
noted, reduced drastically its area under cocoa in
the 1990s. Indonesia is the only major producer with
considerable land availability, though Ghana too has
good potential. Cocoa from Ghana (and, until re-
cently, Cameroon) is considered to be of high quality,
and attracts a premium in the market.
B. The behaviour of cocoa prices
The behaviour of cocoa prices has been typical
of other primary products: wide fluctuations and a
declining secular trend. Table 3 gives the estimates
of price volatility (after adjusting for inflation)4 for
cocoa and a few selected groups of agricultural prod-
ucts. As they have been averaged over the year, these
indices underestimate the price volatility on a day-
to-day basis. However, the year-to-year fluctuations
are likely to give a better sense of the fluctuations in
farmer income, since the price on any single day af-
fects only the trades of that day.
During practically each of the past four dec-
ades, the cocoa price was more unstable than the
entire group of tropical beverages to which cocoa
belongs (the other commodities in the group are cof-
fee and tea) as well as the other commodity groups,
￿vegetable oilseeds and oils￿ and ￿agricultural raw
materials￿. The only exceptions were the 1980s,
when the cocoa price was just a little less volatile
than vegetable oilseeds and oils, and the 1990s, when
it was overall more stable than its own group aver-
age.
The data also indicate that the price volatility
tends to rise in periods of high global inflation, i.e.,
the 1970s and the 1980s, even though inflation as
such seems to have little influence on the volatility
of individual prices. The instability indices relating
to current prices (not shown) are of an order of mag-
nitude similar to those for prices adjusted for general
inflation. What is of significance, however, is that
there is no indication that the economic liberaliza-
tion and globalization of the 1990s made agricultural
prices more unstable. In fact, the instability index in
each case was lower than in the previous decades, in
some cases considerably so. It is also the case that
the International Cocoa Agreements (ICA) of the
1970s and 1980s did little to stabilise prices, an is-
sue taken up later. One likely explanation for the
greater price stability could be the very low prices
of the 1990s. Since cocoa supplies are difficult to
increase in times of scarcity (trees take a long time
to mature) and slow to reduce in periods of abun-
dance (smallholders do not readily shift to other
occupations), cocoa prices are known for their sharp
peaks and long, flat bottoms.
Table 3
PRICE VOLATILITY INDEX FOR COCOA AND
SELECTED COMMODITY GROUPS
(Per cent)
1960￿ 1970￿ 1980￿ 1990￿
1969 1979 1989 1999
Cocoa 16.3 22.0 20.3 11.5
Tropical beverages 5.2 21.0 18.5 17.9
Vegetable oilseeds
   and oils 6.4 17.0 22.7 7.5
Agricultural
   raw materials 4.0 11.6 6.2 5.9
Source: UNCTAD.5 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
The situation with respect to the variability in
the export unit value, which approximates the f.o.b.
price received by the producing country, is rather
different. The data in table 4 show that the volatility
in export unit value (measured in current US dol-
lars) was much higher in each of the major cocoa
producing countries than the volatility in the world
price during the 1980s as well as the 1990s.5 There
is no satisfactory explanation for this, except that
export activity might be concentrated during that part
of the year when cocoa is harvested, a time when
the spot market is more active and fluid.
However, the extent of volatility in the unit
values between the 1980s and 1990s was mixed. The
instability index declined sharply for Ghana, which
did not liberalize its cocoa sector, and increased
sharply for Cameroon, which did. The index changed
very slightly for other countries, falling for C￿te
d￿Ivoire and Indonesia, and rising in the case of
Nigeria and Brazil. The impact of liberalization
measures is examined in the next section.
Even though the international cocoa agreements
and state marketing authorities were meant to inter-
vene in the market, there appears to be no evidence
that this had any discernable impact. The interac-
tion of supply and demand ￿ as reflected in the
movements of world stocks of raw cocoa ￿ seems to
have largely determined the world cocoa price. Fall-
ing stocks imply demand in excess of supply at the
prevailing price, and the opposite occurs when the
stocks rise. Chart 2, which traces the relationship
between the cocoa price (in constant SDRs) and the
ratio of cocoa stocks to grindings (representing de-
mand for cocoa) over the 1961￿2000, provides an
indication that cocoa prices do indeed have a ten-
dency to rise when cocoa stocks are low in relation
to grindings, and vice-versa.
Table 5 gives the 10-year average for both stock
levels and prices over the last four decades. On the
face of it, it is possible to explain the high prices
during the 1970s in terms of low stock levels, and
the low prices of the 1990s in terms of high stocks.
Similarly, comparing the situation during the 1960s
and the 1980s, it is seen that the prices were 11 per
cent lower in the latter period when the stock ratio
was about 8 per cent higher. Thus, even at a fairly
high level of aggregation, the negative relationship
between the stock-to-grinding ratio and the world
price appears to hold rather well.
Nevertheless, a closer examination of the rela-
tionship is warranted. Visual inspection of chart 2
suggests that the relationship is far from stable and
that the price decline during the 1990s is hard to
explain exclusively in terms of the movement of
stocks within the decade. In order to see how the
relationship held up over time, regressions were run
for the data on prices and stocks including and ex-
cluding the time trend. The results are reported in
table 6.6
Taking the 1961￿2001 period as a whole, there
appears to be a fairly robust relationship between
the cocoa price and the stock-to-grinding ratio,
though there is also a statistically significant long-
term declining trend in the price of 2 per cent a year.
In other words, the stock levels have an impact on
cocoa prices in addition to an underlying long-term
declining trend. On an average, each percentage point
increase in the stock ratio is associated with a price
decline of 3 per cent. The time trend and the stock
Table 4
VOLATILITY IN THE EXPORT UNIT VALUE IN MAJOR COCOA PRODUCING COUNTRIES
(Per cent)
Brazil Cameroon C￿te d￿Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Indonesia World price
1980￿1989 18.7 15.3 21.8 25.3 19.8 21.5 14.8
1990￿2000 18.8 27.5 19.5 13.5 20.7 21.2 12.3
Source: Derived from the data on export unit values from the FAO database.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 25
ratio together explain some 75 per cent of the varia-
tion in price over the entire period. This relationship
holds well for the first three sub-periods (covering
1961￿1990 period); in fact, the relationship is even
stronger. The coefficient of the stock ratio is remark-
ably stable at about 3 per cent, whether the decades
are taken together or severally. The price trend over
these three periods, however, shows wide fluctua-
tion; after a declining trend of 4 per cent a year during
1961￿1970, it shoots up to a rising trend of 10 per
cent a year during the 1970s, only to decline again
at a rate of 7 per cent a year during the following
decade. In short, while the sensitivity of the price
with respect to changes in the stock ratio is quite
stable, the time trend captures the impact of factors
specific to the period in question.
The 1990s, however, mark a sharp break with
the past in that the explanatory power of the two
independent variables is greatly diminished. Neither
the stock ratio nor the time trend has a coefficient
that is significant at 95 per cent level of confidence,
though the coefficient for the stocks still remains at
0.3. This suggests that the depressed prices of re-
cent years call for an explanation that goes beyond
the factors that were seen to be historically impor-
tant. At the same time, we need to explain the factors
that are responsible for the secular decline in cocoa
prices, which seems to be independent of the forces
of supply and demand. It would be one thing if the
decline were due to improvements in overall pro-
ductive efficiency; quite another, if it resulted from
declining real wages and general living standards.
Table 5
COCOA PRICES AND THE STOCK RATIO
(10-year period average)
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II. The impact of neoliberal policies
The rise of neoliberalism had a profound influ-
ence on the functioning of commodity markets, their
control within producing countries, and the discus-
sion of the commodity problem itself. International
commodity agreements have been all but abandoned;
the few that still exist stay away from the so-called
￿economic clauses￿, i.e., clauses relating to control
and regulation of production and exports with a view
to maintaining or stabilising prices. In countries with
state bodies engaged in buying, storing, and selling
of commodities, the liberalization measures focused
primarily on their dismantlement. Market liberali-
zation and deregulation also occurred in the industrial
countries, though they showed remarkable pragma-
tism in protecting their interests in agriculture as well
as in other spheres of economic activity.
Cocoa has not been immune to these develop-
ments. Earlier international cocoa agreements relied
on buffer stocks for defending cocoa prices within
specified bands. The scheme failed to stabilise prices
during the 1970s, as there were no stocks that could
be unloaded in the market; besides, producers faced
with high cocoa prices had lost interest in price sta-
bility. In the late 1980s, on the other hand, when the
cocoa price collapsed, the buffer stocks reached
rather quickly their prescribed limit of 250,000 tons
(representing roughly six-weeks of demand for
grindings) without strengthening prices, and the ef-
forts at price stabilization were abandoned. The 1993
cocoa agreement dropped the provisions for buffer
stocks or price ranges altogether.
In order to see how cocoa producers have been
affected by market liberalization, it is necessary to
examine the developments both within producing
developing countries and in consuming, industrial
countries. There has been only scant attention given
to the latter￿s impact on the cocoa market.
A. Market liberalization in producing
countries
When discussing the measures to liberalize
economies, the focus has basically been on the
West African cocoa producers, viz., C￿te d￿Ivoire,
Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria, as these were the
producers where the state had played a dominant role
in cocoa trade. In other respects, the state￿s role in
economic activity or promoting economic develop-
ment has not been too different from cocoa producers
in East Asia or Latin America. The West African
governments were not involved in the production
and harvesting of cocoa, but concentrated on the
purchase of domestic cocoa for export at given
prices. In addition, the government institutions re-
sponsible for this task ￿ marketing boards in the
Anglophone countries (Ghana and Nigeria) and some
sort of centralised funds in the Francophone coun-
tries (C￿te d￿Ivoire and Cameroon) ￿ played a role
in quality control, research on plant breeding, mar-
ket intelligence, and extension service.
There were, however, significant differences
between the two groups of countries as to how the
task of marketing was performed. Typically, the
marketing boards managed the entire marketing
process, buying cocoa directly from producers and
selling it to traders and processors at a specified,
guaranteed price at least for the whole cocoa sea-
son, if not longer. The caisse system, on the other
hand, did not involve ownership or direct handling
Table 6
REGRESSION RESULTS
(Price as dependent variable)
Intercept Time Stock-ratio R2
1961￿2001 50.74 -0.02 -0.03 0.75
(4.75) (6.84)
1961￿1970 90.40 -0.04 -0.03 0.87
(2.95) (5.99)
1971￿1980 -195.82 0.10 -0.03 0.86
(5.03) (3.25)
1981￿1990 153.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.99
(17.56) (18.38)
1991￿2001 170.82 -0.08 -0.03 0.29
(1.71) (1.38)
Note: The regressions are least-squares, semi-logarithmic
in prices. The parentheses give the t values.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 25
of the crop at any stage, but instead relied on private
licensed traders for domestic purchase and export.
The authority, however, did guarantee a producer
price and established a scale for all payments in-
volved from the farm to export and another scale for
the difference between the f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices for
main destinations. As a result, depending on the dif-
ference between the world market price and the guar-
anteed producer price, the fund, in principle, could
accumulate reserves or run them down. Another dif-
ference was that the state trading authority under the
caisse system was administratively not a part of the
government.
The state marketing institutions were estab-
lished by the colonial powers with the aim of
regulating trade in primary commodities, and they
served their purpose more or less satisfactorily dur-
ing the colonial time (Williams, 1985). However, as
in the case of other public bodies in developing
countries, their performance after independence
deteriorated over time. They became large bureauc-
racies, influenced by politics, and increasingly
inefficient in their designated functions. All this was
reflected in the high cost of their operations, which,
given the way the system worked, was borne largely
by cocoa farmers. Among the major producers, the
marketing costs and taxes were seen to be lower in
the countries relying on free markets (viz., Brazil,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria) than those with
marketing boards or stabilization funds (Ruf and de
Milly, 1990). The francophone institutions actually
became insolvent, as they were unable to build up
reserves in the face of high costs of operations and
low world prices. Their increased reliance on the
European Union financing was basically what trig-
gered their dismantlement. The World Bank was
another major force behind this move.
The liberalization programmes aimed to im-
prove productive efficiency through an alignment
of domestic prices with world prices and to give
cocoa farmers improved prices, which were consid-
ered to be low in relation to the f.o.b. price. There
was, in fact, some contradiction between the two
goals since the increased production from liberali-
zation would lower the world price, thereby lowering
the price the cocoa farmer actually received.
Evaluating the impact of market liberalization
measures presents a number of conceptual and prac-
tical difficulties. There are significant differences
among the four major producers as to the timing and
nature of the measures taken. Nigeria dismantled its
marketing boards virtually overnight in 1986, largely
in response to domestic political pressures. Although
it also devalued its currency at about the same time,
Nigeria remained otherwise hesitant in deregulating
and liberalising other spheres of economic activity.
Ghana, on the other hand, started on a series of
economic reforms under the IMF/World Bank-sup-
ported structural adjustment programme in the early
1980s. It brought its fiscal situation under control
and adjusted its exchange rate, and generally liber-
alized the economy. After more than a decade of
neglect, cocoa production and exports started to re-
cover as a result. A number of other policy measures
were taken in the early 1990s, notably, introducing
private sector competition in domestic procurement
and transportation and privatising Produce Buying
Company, a subsidiary of Ghana￿s Cocoa Board
(COCOBOD). More recently, it started to allow pri-
vate companies to export directly 30 per cent of their
domestic purchases (Varangis and Schreiber, 2001).
However, the country resisted successfully the pres-
sure to abolish COCOBOD, though it did drastically
reduce its work force and generally streamlined its
activities in recent years. The government defends
COCOBOD for ensuring the quality of Ghanaian
cocoa, which enjoys a premium in the world mar-
ket.
The measures taken in the two Francophone
countries ￿ first, Cameroon, and later, C￿te d￿Ivoire
￿ were more far-reaching. Cameroon started its re-
forms in 1990, when it abolished its public marketing
body, called Office National de Commercialisatiion
des Produits de Base, or ONCPB. It also adjusted,
among other changes, domestic cocoa price and
marketing margins to eliminate the need for subsi-
dies and confined itself to stabilising price only
within the crop year. The liberalization process in
C￿te d￿Ivoire was initiated in the mid-1990s and
consisted of increasing competition in the procure-
ment and export of cocoa, improving transparency
and accountability of its stabilising fund ￿ Caisse de
Stabilisation (CAISTAB) ￿ while increasing the re-
turns to farmers (Varangis and Schreiber, 2001). In
1999, CAISTAB was abolished, and in its place a
much smaller agency with greatly diminished role
was set up.
In short, market liberalization in some form or
fashion had been proceeding in all of the four coun-
tries of West Africa over a rather long period of time.9 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
Also, the kind and extent of policy change differed
rather widely across countries. Thus, while Ghana
continues to have a marketing board, its overall eco-
nomic system cannot be regarded as less market-
oriented than (say) that of C￿te d￿Ivoire or Nigeria.
Nevertheless, in evaluating the impact of liberaliza-
tion, the researchers have focused basically on one
factor, i.e., the producer￿s share in the f.o.b. price
(See, e.g., Varangis and Schreiber, 2001, Gilbert and
Varangis, 2003). They point out that the countries
free of state marketing ￿ Brazil, Cameroon, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Nigeria ￿ had significantly higher
farmgate prices as a proportion of the export price
(70￿90 per cent) than those of Ghana or C￿te d￿Ivoire
(less than 50 per cent), which did have state market-
ing in 1994￿1995, the year to which the data relate.
Furthermore, they attempt to show that the aboli-
tion of the state marketing authority significantly
lowered domestic marketing costs and taxes.
These two conclusions are actually interrelated
since the producers￿ share in the export price does
depend on the marketing costs and taxes. Indeed,
the data in Gilbert and Varangis (2003) show that
the observed differences in the producers￿ share was
largely due to the much higher implicit or explicit
taxes in Ghana and C￿te d￿Ivoire; the marketing costs
proper differed little across the countries covered
(figure 4 in their paper). However, to the extent the
state institutions provided public services (such as,
quality control and extension service), the reduction
in taxes may not have been an entirely positive de-
velopment. Indeed, there was a sharp deterioration
in the quality of cocoa exported by Cameroon and
Nigeria following the liberalization. But the most
serious weakness of the conclusion that the produc-
er￿s share improved following liberalization is that
it rests basically on the findings for just one year.
Given that export prices are highly unstable, the pro-
ducer￿s share in any one year may not provide a
reliable guide to the actual situation. To remedy this
weakness, table 7 provides the data on the produc-
er￿s share in the export price averaged over 5-year
segments, covering the 1981￿2000 period.
In both Indonesia and Brazil, where there is no
state trading, the producer share in the export price
is indeed generally higher, though it shows consid-
erable variation over time. The extraordinary high
shares in Nigeria and Ghana during 1981￿1985 are
questionable; the cause was probably their grossly
overvalued currencies. One thing, however, seems
clear that abolishing the marketing board in Nigeria
did not have an unambiguous impact on the share.
In the case of Cameroon, the share was already on
the high side just prior to liberalization, but declined
to 62 per cent during the 1996￿2000 period. C￿te
d￿Ivoire embarked on market reforms only towards
the end of the 1990s, but it too shows that there was
an actual decline in the share, when compared to the
earlier periods.
In short, there is no firm evidence that cocoa
farmers actually benefited from market liberaliza-
tion. The liberalization process seems to follow a
set pattern. During the first year or so, a number of
private companies enter the cocoa trade, which tem-
porarily pushes up producer prices. But this phase is
Table 7
PRODUCER PRICES IN PER CENT OF EXPORT UNIT VALUES
(Period averages)
Brazil Cameroon C￿te d￿Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Indonesia
1981￿1985 72.8 55.4 55.1 113.8 120.9 78.9
1986￿1990 68.6 70.9 59.9 37.3 96.1 74.7
1991￿1995 78.9 85.7 65.6 48.2 101.2 84.7
1996￿2000 82.0 62.1 50.5 52.4 89.0 82.6
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followed by a period of consolidation and restruc-
turing when the outcome for the producer depends
on a host of other factors (Fold, 2001). In any case,
the cocoa farmers are not concerned about their share
as such but the actual price they obtain and how it
relates to their productions costs, which vary con-
siderably across countries.
The estimates of production costs are given in
table 8, relating to the 1995￿1999 period, which helps
to even out yearly variations. They have been de-
rived by taking into account three factors: (i) the
estimates of costs for producing one kilogram of
cocoa beans in 1989, provided by an ICCO study
(Ruf and de Milly, 1990); (ii) an adjustment for the
improvements in yields between 1989 and 1995￿
1999, taking it as an approximation for productivity
improvements across countries (derived from the
FAO database); and (iii) an allowance for the ef-
fects of domestic inflation and exchange rate changes
during the period in question on the basis of the IMF
data. The resulting estimates do not take into account
the costs of replanting and new planting and are at
best a rough approximation.
Indonesia￿s production costs ￿ at 36 US cents a
kilogram ￿ is far and away the lowest. Though its
yields improved greatly during the 1990s (table 2),
the catastrophic decline in the rupiah exchange rate
consequent to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was
a much more important factor. On the other hand,
the estimates for Ghana and Nigeria are on the high
side, probably for the opposite reasons: domestic
inflation was not adequately compensated by an ad-
justment in the exchange rate, though both also
suffered large declines in yields. Despite the weak-
nesses of the estimates, it is probably safe to say
that Brazil and Nigeria have now become the high-
est cost producers, though their reasons are different.
In Brazil, the major cause for the rise in costs was
the deterioration in yields following the outbreak of
a plant disease. In Nigeria, the neglect and general
mismanagement are the main factors: cocoa produc-
tion is not a priority sector in that country and there
has been considerable migration of young working-
age population out of cocoa areas.
Overall, the variations in yields across coun-
tries appear to be the most important factor in
production costs, where the market liberalization did
not have much impact. There is also no systematic
evidence that the cocoa growers in countries with-
out state marketing enjoyed a higher financial
surplus. On the face of it, Brazil, Ghana, and Ni-
Table 8
ESTIMATES OF COSTS OF PRODUCTION IN MAJOR COCOA PRODUCERS
Ratio of production costs to
Producer Export producer price export price
Production costs $/kg price price (per cent) (per cent)
1989 1995￿1999        1995￿1999
Brazil 1.00 1.62 1.18 1.44 137 112
Cameroon 0.83 0.60 0.82 1.34 73 45
C￿te d￿Ivoire 0.66 0.60 0.68 1.36 87 44
Ghana 0.48 1.27 0.78 1.48 163 86
Indonesia 0.60 0.36 1.17 1.14 30 31
Malaysia 1.00 0.85 1.20 1.20 71 71
Nigeria 0.50 2.16 0.92 1.34 235 161
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geria operated on a loss, though in Ghana￿s case,
costs were lower than the export price by a significant
margin. The ratio of production costs to producer￿s
price was roughly similar for Cameroon, C￿te
d￿Ivoire, and Malaysia.
Finally, although there are only seven observa-
tions, there appears to be a weak correlation between
a country￿s production costs to producer price ratio
and the expansion of its output over the 1989￿1999
period, i.e., a country with a larger surplus over costs
tended to show a larger increase in its output
(chart 3). The country with the largest output in-
crease, Indonesia, was also the one with the lowest
production costs. The next biggest increase in out-
put occurred in C￿te d￿Ivoire, which amounted to
more than 50 per cent over the period with a cost/
price ratio of 87 per cent.
B. Structural changes in the world cocoa
market
Dismantlement of government regulations and
market liberalism were not confined to the cocoa
producing countries. There occurred significant
changes also in the industrialized countries ￿ the
main consumers of cocoa ￿ that had a profound im-
pact on the structure of the market and price
formation. The recent behaviour of international
cocoa prices, which seems to break with the histori-
cal trends, can be explained to a large extent by these
developments. The change in the market structure
had in particular two consequences for the forma-
tion of cocoa prices: (i) there was an evident decline
in the level of cocoa stocks needed to carry on the
processing and chocolate manufacturing activities
in the European countries (the principal market), but
also elsewhere; and (ii) the world market price ap-
pears to have become rather less sensitive to the
forces of supply and demand.
There have been four developments that have
had a significant influence on the functioning of the
cocoa market in recent years, even though they
evolved over a longer period of time. First, a few
large transnational corporations have now come to
dominate the cocoa trade (as in other commodities),
having taken over, replaced, or merged with the
smaller companies engaged in trading physical co-
coa. This development has benefited from the
dramatic improvements in communications, which
enable individual companies to develop efficient
market intelligence and facilitate the management
of large-scale transnational operations.
Secondly, the old distinction between trading
and processing companies has become blurred, as
most large trading companies are now also engaged
in cocoa processing, sourcing beans directly from
exporting countries to take advantage of the scale
economies in transport, storage, and processing. This
occurred because the large chocolate manufacturers
decided to hive off the less profitable processing of
cocoa into intermediate products (cocoa liquor, co-
coa butter, and cocoa powder) from their core
activities. However, at the high-end, chocolate manu-
facturers continue to do their own processing to
ensure quality. By the mid-1990s, some 70 per cent
of all grindings was done by the top 10 firms, with
the three largest cocoa-processing companies ￿
Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), Barry Callebaut,
and Cargill ￿ dominating the market. They account
for some 40￿50 per cent of world grindings at
present, and are expected to reach the 75 per cent
mark within a few years (Fold, 2001).
The third development is linked to the second
development. With the disappearance of the state-
Chart 3
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dominated marketing structures in cocoa producing
countries, large transnational companies have, to a
considerable extent, taken over also the exporting
functions in the producing countries. According to a
recent ICCO report (ICCO, 2001), some 90 per cent
of cocoa exports from C￿te d￿Ivoire are now han-
dled by companies that are subsidiaries or have close
links with the international companies engaged in
cocoa trade. Similarly, in Sulawesi ￿ the cocoa pro-
ducing area of Indonesia ￿ there were some 60
national traders engaged in cocoa exports as recently
as 1998; by the year 2000, only two were left, the
rest having been taken over by foreign companies
(Humphrey, 2002). This process of corporate inte-
gration and concentration has also been driven by
changes in transportation that have resulted in econo-
mies of scale. Cocoa is no longer being shipped in
bags, but in large containers directly to end-users,
which has considerably reduced handling costs at
both ends of the shipment.
Finally, there has been increased concentration
in the chocolate manufacturing industry, which is
itself a result of globalization and increased impor-
tance of brand recognition and marketing strategies.
Following some 200 takeovers in the chocolate in-
dustry during 1970￿1990 period, only 17 firms have
come to control about half of the world market in
chocolate, with five firms ￿ NestlØ, Mars, Hershey,
Kraft-Jacob-Suchard, and Cadbury-Schweppes ￿
enjoying a dominating position (Fold, 2001). The
ICCO (2001) study notes: ￿The process has involved
takeovers of smaller companies by the large inter-
national concerns, mergers to form larger combined
entities and incursion of the international compa-
nies into new or developing markets￿ (p. 7). This
mirrors the developments on the retail side, where
market concentration has also increased, with large
supermarkets turning into basically renters of shelf
space.
The overall result of these developments has
been that cocoa producers face a monopsony situa-
tion on the sale side (i.e., there are only a few buyers
that they can sell to). On the retail side of the fin-
ished product, consumers face pretty close to a
monopoly situation. The consequence of the in-
creased concentration along the supply chain ￿ trade,
processing, and manufacture of chocolate ￿ is that
the procurement and provision of intermediate prod-
ucts is not governed wholly by ￿arm￿s length￿
arrangements, but by long-term inter-corporate
agreements, contracts or understandings. Apart from
the issue of who benefited from these developments
(taken up in the next section), they have implica-
tions for both the need for carrying stocks and price
formation.
There have been two parallel developments that
have reduced the need for stocks. One, as there are
now much fewer firms at each level of the activity,
the need for stocks to carry on normal business ac-
tivity has considerably declined. This results from
the fact that, in relation to their turnover, larger firms
tend to carry stocks at a lower level than do smaller
firms. At the same time, traders and processors now
face a relatively stable and reliable demand from their
partners and associates in business, which also re-
duces the level of stocks to be held. The second
development is of a technological nature. As in other
manufacturing activity, chocolate manufacturers
have started to rely on modern management tech-
niques and practices to reduce their costs, in particular,
the adoption of the just-in-time inventory manage-
ment practice, where supplies of inputs are obtained
as required in manufacturing. Within Europe ￿ the
biggest market for chocolate ￿ a handful of proces-
sors (mostly based in the Netherlands) have delivery
vehicles working virtually round-the-clock, respond-
ing to the demand from the manufacturers all over
the continent.
The decline in the requirements for stocks by
itself could be an adequate explanation for the gen-
erally depressed prices in recent years. Throughout
the 1990s, the stocks-to-grinding ratio remained in
excess of 55 per cent, compared to the long-term
average of roughly 40 per cent for the four decades,
1961￿2001. The ratio declined during the 1995￿
1999, but it did not fall much below 50 per cent.
Thus, there appear to be two factors at play in keep-
ing the cocoa price low: the stocks have been at
historically a very high level in recent years, while
the need for stocks for carrying on business has also
declined quite substantially. The result is that there
is a large overhang of unwanted stocks that has con-
tinued to keep cocoa prices depressed.
The question then arises as to why the stock
levels have not been adjusted downwards, which is
to say why cocoa supplies have persistently out-
stripped demand, despite low prices. There was
certainly some influence on the output, in that it has
remained more or less stagnant at about 2.8 million13 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
tons since 1995. However, the key is the behaviour
of individual producers, which has been sharply dis-
similar. Overall, production from the seven major
cocoa producers rose by less than 15 per cent be-
tween 1990 and 2000. However, two countries
dominated the expansion: C￿te d￿Ivoire and the low-
cost Indonesia together accounted for virtually the
entire increase (63 per cent and 35 per cent, respec-
tively), while the relatively modest increases in
Ghana and Nigeria just about offset the declines in
Brazil and Malaysia.7 It was seen earlier (table 8)
that, despite low world prices, the production costs
in Indonesia particularly but also in C￿te d￿Ivoire
allowed producers a significant margin.
In short, there continued to be producers who
were willing to supply cocoa at the low price. The
increased productivity could partly be the reason,
but, as seen earlier, rising yields and improved pro-
ductivity did not occur everywhere in the cocoa
producing areas. A major reason must have been that
smallholder farmers accepted a sharp decline in their
incomes rather than moving out of cocoa produc-
tion. In some countries, the depreciated exchange
rates and depressed wages helped the process. There
is, however, very little information on wages and
incomes earned by cocoa growers. According to one
study for C￿te d￿Ivoire (Bonjean and Chambas,
2001), there is evidence of increasing poverty and
declining incomes in cocoa producing areas.
Before concluding this section, it is necessary
to consider one other factor that has sometimes been
held responsible for falling cocoa prices. This re-
lates to the role of the so-called terminal market, i.e.,
the market for commodity futures. Since producers
now rely on private traders rather than state authori-
ties, the bulk of cocoa sales have shifted from the
forward market to the spot market. The result is that
physical sales activity is concentrated only in a few
months. The state marketing authorities used to rely
on forward contracts so that they could offer a guar-
anteed price to local producers. However, this
development might have increased the volatility
within the crop year rather than pushing down the
longer-term prices. Similarly, the dramatic rise in
options trading and the emergence of commodity
funds may (or may not) have increased price vola-
tility, but are unlikely to have affected the market
fundamentals.
III. Revisiting the generic issues
Cocoa is a representative commodity: its world
market price is highly volatile and has been on a
declining trend, and the producers do not appear to
have benefited from the technological and other pro-
ductivity enhancing improvements, whether in their
own countries or along the value chain. These have
been perennial problems, but the neoliberal policies
were not aimed at dealing with them. Some propo-
nents of neoliberalism felt that the commodity
problem could not or should not be addressed, as it
was a market outcome, while others believed that
freely functioning markets would somehow tackle
them. The search for solutions has now become more
difficult, for it must be carried out in an environ-
ment where there is widespread suspicion of public
action and institutions. In particular, there is little
support today for a revival of international commod-
ity agreements or re-establishment of state marketing
authorities. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here
to revisit the generic issues from a perspective that
is generally lacking today.
A. Price instability
In dealing with the issue of volatile markets,
the measures designed to stabilise producers￿ income
should be distinguished from the issue of price sta-
bility. The STABEX is a well-known example of a
scheme designed to provide compensation, on an ex-
poste basis, for unforeseen export earnings shortfalls
to a number of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
countries under the various LomØ Conventions on
EU-ACP cooperation. The IMF￿s Compensatory Fi-
nancing Scheme (CFS) was also designed to provide
short-term financing as balance of payments support
to producer countries that faced adverse devel-
opments in their export markets. Neither of the
two schemes is currently operative. STABEX was
abandoned when the last LomØ Convention was ne-
gotiated, although thought is now being given to its
revival in some form. The main reason why the CFS
has been little used over the years is that the financ-
ing under the scheme is contingent on the country
concerned being able to satisfy the IMF as to the
temporary nature of the price fall, a condition that14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 25
primary producers have found difficult to fulfil.
Funds are not available if the price fall is seen as
following a secular trend.
With respect to price stability, a distinction can
be drawn between measures that aim to stabilise pro-
ducer prices within producing countries, as was
attempted by the state marketing authorities, and
measures that stabilise world market prices, as was
intended under the early International Cocoa Agree-
ments (ICAs). At the national level, the goal of price
stability can be either short-term, i.e., confined to
stabilising intra-year prices, or longer term, cover-
ing a few years.
Along with the abolition of the state marketing
authorities, the effort at stabilising producer prices
was also abandoned. As a result, there is evidence
of increased price instability. It was earlier noted (ta-
ble 4) that the export prices during the 1990s had
become more volatile in Cameroon (without the state
marketing authority), while Ghana experienced the
opposite. Gilbert and Varangis (2003) show that the
producer prices, following market liberalization,
became considerably more volatile in Cameroon,
C￿te d￿Ivoire, and Nigeria, though not in Ghana, the
only country that still keeps its marketing board.
The only recent initiative to address the con-
tinuing problem of price instability has come from a
few experts in the World Bank and UNCTAD
(though so far without institutional endorsement),
promoting the idea of ￿market-based risk manage-
ment￿ instruments (See, e.g., Dehn, 2000 and Larson,
Verangis, and Yabuki 1998). Insofar as hedging in-
struments are concerned, there is nothing new in the
proposal, as traders have for a long time been hedg-
ing themselves against price uncertainty through the
futures market. Traders with physical stocks of a
commodity routinely protect themselves against
price decline, by selling futures contracts. Thus, if
the price actually declines, they can recover the loss
by buying back futures contract; the opposite oc-
curs if the price rises. In short, a hedged trader￿s
gains or losses in the physical market are offset
through losses or gains in the futures market.
Where however the new proposals differ is in
tapping the interest in options trading on the part of
large commodity funds. Options trading can be a
more attractive instrument against uncertainty than
straightforward hedges, for they enable traders with
stocks to protect themselves against a price fall with-
out forgoing the possibility of taking advantage of a
rising market. This is done by buying a put option,
giving the trader the right to sell the product at a
specified price, which is exercised if the price de-
clines. The payoff on the bet turning out favourable
can be quite considerable, unlike the ordinary hedge
which basically offsets gains or losses. But several
things need to be considered. First, the use of options
and hedges as protection against price uncertainty,
like any insurance, has a cost, which is directly pro-
portional to the risks involved. The cost of options,
as indeed of ordinary hedges, tends to rise both with
the length of time covered and with the market￿s
volatility. These instruments are therefore useful only
for covering a relatively short period of time (around
three months), without the cost becoming prohibi-
tive. To state the obvious, these instruments, like
conventional hedges, simply offer protection against
price uncertainty; they do not deal with the volatil-
ity itself.
Secondly, options are a particularly risky in-
strument if they end up being used as bets on the
market behaviour, i.e., the risk of a hedger turning
into a speculator. Options trading is notorious for its
vulnerability to irregularities of all kinds. There have
been many instances where the institution engaged
in options trading has been rendered bankrupt
through actions of a lone trader (UNCTAD, 2003,
provides a useful list of avenues for fraud in trad-
ing.) In short, adequate regulation and supervision
of options trading as well as high personal integrity
of professionals engaged in trading would be crucial
if the farmers are to be protected against misman-
agement or fraud. These are governance require-
ments that seem to go well beyond the skills required
to successfully manage a state marketing authority.
Finally, individual cocoa farmers do not have
sufficient means, size, or the expertise to purchase
hedging instruments. The promoters of the idea do
recognise this problem, but some believe that, in the
absence of a state authority, the problem could be
overcome by local institutions, notably, farmers￿
cooperatives. Cooperatives enjoy an appeal for a
variety of reasons, but there are few examples in
developing countries of success. A major problem is
with respect to their being established. Ideally, they
should arise out of some grass-roots movement, but
it seems unlikely that options trading would be high
on the movement￿s list of priorities. On the other
hand, state-sponsored cooperatives have their own
problems, most serious being the question of own-15 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
ership with respect to their functions and policies.
In any case, there is still no assurance that the coop-
erative would be of a size, financial strength, and
capability to manage options trading. All in all, the
chances of a cooperative movement in any of the
West African cocoa producing countries becoming
a force capable of marshalling the needed expertise
and resources appear rather slim.
Nevertheless, hedges and options do have a
place in commodity trade. Given the recognition that
the abolition of state marketing authorities created
an institutional vacuum, there is a place for stream-
lined quasi-state bodies that are independent of the
government but are answerable to it for their per-
formance. They are required in order to undertake
some of the neglected tasks, such as quality control,
handling of storage and transportation, and research
and extension service. There is also a need to take
advantage of buyers￿ need for insurance against price
instability, which should result in sharing, if not com-
plete elimination, of the cost of a hedge. Provided
there is adequate oversight and regulation, these
bodies could be allowed to use hedging instruments
to facilitate their management of stocks and trading
activities. The financial performance of the old mar-
keting authorities could conceivably have been
improved with greater, but judicious, use of such
instruments.
With respect to stabilising world prices, it seems
unlikely that a mechanism would emerge in the fore-
seeable future. The memory of the past cocoa
agreements￿ failure at price stability is too fresh and
the industrial countries have no interest in a mecha-
nism to stabilise prices. As Gilbert (1996) put it: ￿The
commodity agreement movement is effectively
dead￿ (p. 1).8
The ICAs suffered from problems common to
other commodity agreements. The earlier agree-
ments, as noted, relied on buffer stocks to keep the
market price within specified ranges, but there were
no stocks that could be released to arrest the steep
price rise of the 1970s while the situation was just
the opposite when the stipulated stock level was in-
sufficient to prevent cocoa prices from falling. A lack
of adequate financing was a related factor that sty-
mied the market operations under the third agreement
that came into operation in 1981. The matters were
not helped by the fact that the largest cocoa producer
￿ C￿te d￿Ivoire ￿ did not join the first three agree-
ments, nor did a major consumer, the United States.
B. Possibilities for price maintenance
Price stabilization and maintenance are closely
related issues, for they both turn fundamentally on
producers￿ ability to regulate their supplies. While
an international agreement might be unrealistic at
this stage, the prospects of regulating cocoa supplies
by the cocoa producers, either under the umbrella of
ICCO or on their own, seem promising, even though
there are serious difficulties to overcome. In fact,
the 1993 ICA contained a provision (Article 29) for
producers to organise production curtailment arrange-
ments to overcome market imbalances. Similarly,
the 2001 ICA, while not mentioning production
curtailment, provides for coordination of national
production policies (Article 34). This suggests that
at least those consuming countries that are signato-
ries to the ICAs are not averse to measures to maintain
prices. In fact, there is a vocal civil society in indus-
trial countries that advocates for ￿remunerative
prices￿ for primary producers.
It is well recognized that primary products suf-
fer from long periods when price remains below long
run costs, which causes severe hardship to produc-
ers and difficulties for the government. When faced
with similar problems, the industrial countries, de-
spite strong neoliberal ideology, have shown a
remarkable degree of pragmatism, offering protec-
tion as well as financial aid to agriculture or ailing
industry, justifying it on grounds of hardship to some
domestic group or unfairness of other countries￿ ac-
tions. Primary producing countries can take a leaf
from this experience: if arrangements to regulate
production or exports are not possible under an in-
ternational agreement, producers could come
together with the aim of improving on their own the
markets for their products. Such cooperation is also
needed for strengthening their bargaining position
vis-￿-vis transnational corporations engaged in trade
in commodities in question.
There have been a number of past attempts at
producers￿ alliance, most well known being the
OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries). Others have included coffee, tin, and
natural rubber. A cartel-like action was also tried in
aluminium, a manufactured product, in the early
1990s, to withstand the threat of supplies from the
former Soviet Union disrupting the market (Gilbert,
1995). The experience of these alliances indicates
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conditions that must be fulfilled or at least substan-
tially fulfilled. The first condition is that all major
producers share a common interest and vision in
controlling production or exports so that a collec-
tive action has sufficient support. The problem arises
because the costs of the action are borne by the alli-
ance members (i.e., withholding production or
exports), but the benefits are shared by all produc-
ers. This problem of free ride can more easily be
tackled if there are only a few producers of the com-
modity in question.
Secondly, a price level completely divorced
from market forces can only be maintained for a very
limited period of time. The bigger the difference
between the price that the alliance members want
and the free market price, the more difficult it be-
comes to maintain the target price. The payoff on
cheating is directly proportional to this difference
and under pressure an alliance risks its breakdown.
There is also the consideration that higher the target
price, more likely would it be for non-alliance
sources of supplies to emerge.
Cocoa appears to be an ideal candidate as far
as the first condition is concerned: the number of
major producers is very small and there is a com-
mon view that some degree of supply regulation is
needed. As seen earlier, seven producers account for
virtually the entire world output, of which three ￿
C￿te d￿Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia ￿ account for
close to three-quarters. C￿te d￿Ivoire is far and away
the biggest producer and could enjoy the status of a
￿swing voter￿, rather similar to the Saudi Arabia￿s
role in the OPEC. This means that its vote could be
decisive in situations where other producers are di-
vided on a particular issue (Gilbert and Smit, 2003).
Four of the largest producers are in the same
region and geographically more or less contiguous,
which should make monitoring of production and
exports somewhat easier. At the same time, two pro-
ducers ￿ Brazil and Malaysia ￿ appear to have lost
interest in cocoa. Cocoa is expensive to produce in
these countries and is not particularly vital to their
economic interests. Since basically large estates are
involved, the switchover to alternative opportuni-
ties should be easier.
Thus, if the three big producers ￿ C￿te d￿Ivoire,
Indonesia, and Ghana ￿ were to agree on a scheme
to regulate production and/or exports, it should not
be too difficult to get the other two producers,
Cameroon and Nigeria, on board. As far as Nigeria
is concerned, it has neither the available land nor a
particularly favourable environment for cocoa pro-
duction (Ruf and de Milly, 1990). At any rate, cocoa
is only of minor importance to that country, account-
ing for less than 1 per cent of its total exports.
Cameroon, on the other hand, has both land and suit-
able environment, and cocoa remains a major export,
close to 15 per cent of its export earnings. However,
being a relatively small producer, it poses little threat
to the big three and its needs or interests should not
be too difficult to accommodate.
There remains, however, the possibility of new
comers, as has happened in coffee, who could free
ride the market. This cannot be ruled out but this
threat may not be exaggerated. With a depressed
world market, cocoa is not a particularly attractive
crop for newcomers, considering that it takes sev-
eral years before the investment starts to pay. The
important thing is that the producers respect the sec-
ond condition mentioned above, i.e., they should aim
at a price that can realistically be maintained and
defended. In any case, production or export regulat-
ing mechanisms cannot be expected to last indefi-
nitely; periodic revisions of the maintained price are
necessary if market forces are not to overwhelm the
situation.
In short, the success in managing production
to maintain prices turns essentially on the three larg-
est cocoa producers. They do at present have internal
political problems to deal with, while also needing
improvements in their respective cocoa sectors
(particularly, in Ghana, but also C￿te d￿Ivoire), but
agreeing on each other￿s share in the world market
need not be an insurmountable problem. A common
position among the key producers could also
strengthen their bargaining position vis-￿-vis the
transnational corporations that they must deal with.
C. Cocoa producers and the value chain
As cocoa moves from the farmgate to the port
for export and then on to the final consumer, it goes
through both a process of handling (i.e., grading of
output, packaging, domestic transport, paperwork,
trade finance, etc.) and actual physical processing,
which consists at the earliest stage (usually carried
out by the grower himself) of drying the fruit and17 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
preparing the beans, and later of producing the fin-
ished product, usually in the form of chocolate.
Talbot (2002) provides a stylised sketch of the value
chain for cocoa as follows:
cocoa pods ￿> ￿rest￿ ￿> ￿remove seeds￿
￿> ferment ￿> dry ￿> cocoa beans ￿>
roast ￿> shell ￿> cocoa nibs ￿> grind
￿> chocolate liquor ￿> press ￿> cocoa
butter and powder ￿> chocolate (along
with the input of sugar and milk).
Basically, the commodity moves from the
grower to a collector or a village-level trader after
having been dried and fermented. The commodity is
then acquired by a national trader, which could be a
state marketing authority, who does the grading and
quality control before its being exported. In some
cases ￿ but only to a very small extent in West Af-
rica and Indonesia ￿ cocoa beans are processed into
intermediate products (cocoa liquor, butter, or pow-
der) for export. The product is then either taken over
by an international trader or processor, who typi-
cally has long-term arrangements with established
large chocolate confectioners, or gets traded in the
world commodity market. It is then the chocolate
manufacturer who arranges the retailing of the fin-
ished product. Cocoa generally constitutes less than
10 per cent of the costs of manufactured chocolate.
The question arises, how various steps along
the value chain are controlled and coordinated, es-
pecially when the crossing of national boundaries is
involved. In particular, the question arises as to how
improvements in productive efficiency get shared
between producers of primary products in develop-
ing countries and final consumers in industrial
countries. In the case of cocoa, as for some other
primary products, producers have been hit hard by
the depressed prices, but this has had little impact
on the price of the finished product. This means that
cocoa producers have faced price declines without
the benefit of a commensurate increase in demand
that would have followed from a price decline in
chocolate (Morisset, 1997). Thus, from the perspec-
tive of economic advancement, the distribution of
value added between primary producing, develop-
ing countries and the consuming, industrial countries
has become no less an important issue than the level
and instability of the price.
The distribution of value added and the appro-
priation of profit at each stage of the chain depend
on the market structure, the rules governing com-
mercial transactions, and the corporate relationships
that develop at each level. In the case of agricultural
commodities, in addition, the ecology, specific
processing requirements (including phytosanitary
considerations), and the ease of mechanization,
storability, and transport all play a role in structur-
ing transnational commercial relationships (Talbot,
2002). If atomistic competition prevailed (i.e., all
sellers and buyers were so insignificant that they
could not individually influence the market price)
and if the bargaining power was not dependent on
agents￿ economic status, the market could be relied
upon to settle more or less satisfactorily the ques-
tion of who gets what at different stages. However,
in the case of primary commodities, that is far from
being the case, and is one reason why globalization
and market liberalization are viewed with suspicion
by those who have little control over how markets
function.
Smallholder cocoa farmers must sell what they
produce at pretty much the price they can get. They
depend on village traders for temporary finance, and
there are usually no more than one or two traders
that they can go to. As the product moves to the port
for export, it goes through various handlers, none of
which operates in a competitive environment. In the
past, the state marketing authority enjoyed a monop-
sonist￿s position; today, the situation with respect to
reward sharing between local agents and overseas
monopolies has become quite opaque. As the inter-
mediate product moves to its final destination in the
consuming countries, the market structure is char-
acterised by high corporate concentration. All in all,
only a fraction of world cocoa supplies actually gets
traded in the world market; an undetermined but large
portion is not traded on the basis of arm￿s length
arrangements.
In short, the cocoa value chain is held to be
￿buyer-driven￿, i.e., it is the buyer ￿ the international
trader, typically a transnational ￿ who decides where
to purchase and process the raw material (Raikes et
al., 2000; Talbot, 2002). A number of factors have
contributed to keeping cocoa producers￿ control
rather limited in the value chain. A major factor in
increased dependence on foreign companies has been
the general deterioration of infrastructure (rural
roads, seaport facilities) and the disappearance of
local capabilities in marketing and quality control
following the abolition of state marketing authori-
ties. This situation is in sharp contrast to the colonial18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 25
times, when the colonial powers invested large re-
sources into building the local infrastructure as well
as state institutions only to further their trade inter-
ests (Fold, 2001).
The evident unfavourable economics of pro-
ducing intermediate products has been another factor
that has kept cocoa producers at the low end of the
value chain. The process is highly capital and en-
ergy intensive, while the intermediate products do
not enjoy an advantage in transport over cocoa beans
(ITC, 2001). Given these handicaps, the progres-
sively high duties on processed products in the
industrial countries (table 9) would seem to be un-
necessary, but they certainly make a bad situation
worse. Certainly, the productivity-improving devel-
opments in the industrial countries have not proved
to be favourable to giving cocoa producers a better
share in the value chain. For example, a supplier in
a cocoa producing countries is just not able to sup-
ply the intermediate products on a just-in-time basis
to a chocolate manufacturer in Europe, even if all
other handicaps were somehow overcome.
There are nevertheless a few examples of lead-
ing chocolate manufacturers investing in processing
capacity in a developing country, especially in the
processing of organic chocolate. In response to the
pressure from civil society, transnational corpora-
tions have started to show interest in ￿fair trade￿
(i.e., ensuring that cocoa is produced where envi-
ronmental and labour standards are respected) and
signed a protocol at the ILO against child labour in
cocoa production, even though there is little evidence
that the problem is serious or widespread. These
developments may be deemed desirable from some
perspective, but they are unlikely to help the vast
majority of cocoa producers. The problem is that
these otherwise legitimate concerns serve only to
divert attention from producers￿ immediate concerns
and the pursuit of fair trade in practice has come to
mean unfair trade for all but a few.
The conclusion from all these qualifications,
however, is not that cocoa producers cannot improve
their status in value chain. After all, two cocoa pro-
ducers ￿ Brazil and Malaysia ￿ have built up
considerable domestic processing capacity and im-
port cocoa beans from other producers for processing
purposes. This happened, not as a result of the freely
functioning market, but through active government
support and direction at an early stage. The avail-
ability of local enterprise and existence of domestic
demand for chocolate were seen to be other factors
favouring processing, though Malaysia did not ful-
fil the latter condition (Talbot, 2002). Although other
cocoa producers do have some processing capacity,
they are at least for present handicapped for reasons
given above, and the examples of Brazil and Malay-
sia may not be replicable. For them, an improvement
in their position in the value chain could be realised
through a careful regulation of production and ex-
ports to the world market as well as better quality
control and investment in infrastructure.
IV. Conclusion
The real fault with the neoliberal policy pre-
scriptions lies in the fact that they failed to target
the fundamental problems of concern to the cocoa
producing countries. The problems they did address
￿ improving productive efficiency and producers￿
share in the price ￿ while important were not the
ones that preoccupied most cocoa producers. How-
ever, a more serious consequence of neoliberalism
seems to have been the creation of an intellectual
environment of do-nothing, laissez-faire. Under this,
any search for solutions to unstable and low primary
goods prices is dismissed as a waste of time. As such,
the most important step to be taken to bring com-
modities back on the trade-finance-development
agenda is to challenge this mindset and open up the
debate to a freer exchange of ideas. Application of
free market principles may very well be useful here.
Even within their limited, stated goals, the
market liberalization measures do not appear to have
Table 9




Raw cocoa 0.5 0.0 0.0
Intermediate products 9.7 0.2 7.0
Final products 30.6 15.3 21.7
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been a resounding success. There is little evidence
that they helped to improve productive efficiency in
cocoa producing areas. Such increase in yields as
occurred in Cameroon and C￿te d￿Ivoire resulted
from investments made before the measures were
adopted. In Nigeria￿s case, there was an actual dete-
rioration. Little attention was given to investments
in infrastructure and delivery systems that would
have had a greater impact on raising productive ef-
ficiency. Improving cocoa growers￿ share in the
export price was indeed a worthy goal, but here too
the results were mixed. In any case, the producer￿s
share on its own provides little indication on the
benefits for the cocoa grower, but little interest was
shown in examining this matter in relation to pro-
duction costs and the market price.
However, while they did not quite achieve their
stated objectives, the market liberalization measures
do not appear to have done much harm either, at least
as far as cocoa is concerned. There is no evidence
that these measures increased price instability;
equally, it would be wrong to credit them with the
evident reduction in the price instability. The prices
were more stable during the 1990s simply because
they had come closest to the bottom. Nor can the
market liberalization be held responsible for the de-
pressed prices, but only if this paper￿s conclusion
that the recent output increase had little to do with
those measures is held to be valid.
There is little question that the state marketing
authorities suffered from serious problems, some of
which were aggravated by the depressed cocoa prices
as well as a poor macroeconomic environment in
the producing countries. But it now seems doubtful
that the remedy lay in abolishing them altogether.
The counsellors of liberalization gave little consid-
eration to revamping the state institutions before
deciding on their dismantlement. Though far from
perfect, Ghana￿s Cocoa Board offers an example of
the kind of improvements that can indeed be made.
The need for a public body to assure cocoa
quality and provide other public goods (market in-
telligence, research, and extension) is now being
widely appreciated. There is also the consideration
of regulating cocoa output to arrest the continuing
decline in prices. If there is to be a producers￿ alli-
ance, a public agency that can control exports,
manage stocks, and regulate production would be a
sine qua non. Then, too, there is the question of im-
proving the position of cocoa producers in the value
chain, where state action and promotion would be
vital.
Finally, this paper dismissed the possibility of
a future international cocoa agreement that would
include clauses to stabilise and maintain prices.
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in manag-
ing price bands and buffer stocks, we do not believe
that there would be any support for such a scheme
in the industrial countries for the foreseeable future.
But this should not stop the producers from explor-
ing ways of managing the cocoa market on their own.
The prospects for a producers￿ alliance in cocoa ap-
pear at least as good as in natural rubber or coffee,







































Derivation of cocoa costs of production
ESTIMATES OF COSTS OF PRODUCTION IN MAJOR COCOA PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Percentage
Production Per cent Production Adjustment Production Producer Costs in Export Costs in increase
costs change in costs factor for costs price per cent of unit value per cent of in output
US$/kga yield/ha (1989 prices) inflationb (current prices) US$/kg prod. price  US$/kg unit value 1989￿1998
1989 Average 1995￿1999
Brazil 1.00 -38.1 1.62 nac 1.62 1.18 137 1.44 112 -32.8
Cameroon 0.83 14.8 0.72 0.83 0.60 0.82 73 1.34 45 -0.2
C￿te d￿Ivoire 0.66 5.1 0.63 0.95 0.60 0.68 87 1.36 44 53.3
Ghana 0.48 -31.2 0.70 1.82 1.27 0.78 163 1.48 86 33.7
Indonesia 0.60 31.4 0.46 0.78 0.36 1.17 30 1.14 31 231.6
Malaysia 1.00 19.0 0.84 1.01 0.85 1.20 71 1.20 71 -72.7
Nigeria 0.50 -10.3 0.56 3.87 2.16 0.92 235 1.34 161 12.4
a The source for these data is Ruf and de Milly (1990).
b This adjustment allows for the effect of inflation and exchange rate changes during the period.
c For Brazil, the data on inflation and exchange rate changes are not available for the period covered.21 Commodities under Neoliberalism: The Case of Cocoa
Notes
1 The protection of agriculture in the industrial countries
was taken out of the GATT-framework, and it continues
until today to be an area of controversy and hypocrisy in
multilateral trade negotiations.
2 President Jacques Chirac, speaking to the 22nd Summit
of the Heads of State of Africa and France, Paris, 20 Feb-
ruary 2003.
3 ￿Value chain￿ basically refers to the chain of value added
as a commodity moves and gets processed from the
farmgate to the final consumer.
4 The instability index has been derived by taking the av-
erage of the deviations from the trend-line estimated by
means of least-squares.
5 The volatility index for world price in this table is differ-
ent from the one in table 3, as the data here relate to
current prices.
6 The table does not include the regressions without the
time trend, since those were consistently inferior to the
ones with the trend. This is suggestive of the influence
of longer-term factors that are influencing the price be-
haviour.
7 This would appear to dispose of the hypothesis in Gil-
bert and Varangis (2003) that the market liberalization
caused cocoa production to increase and depress prices.
Leaving aside Indonesia, the production increase occurred
mostly in countries that did not liberalize.
8 The movement may be dead, but at least this author be-
lieves that it is not yet buried. For one thing, the interna-
tional commodity agreements were far from being a total
failure. In virtually each case, the commodity agreement
failed for specific but different reasons. Secondly, the
commodity agreements never enjoyed the wholehearted
support of the consumers for rather narrow, self-interest
reasons. And, finally, a comprehensive approach to the
commodity problem, covering all major commodities ￿
as envisaged by Keynes or in UNCTAD￿s Integrated Pro-
gramme ￿ was never tried.
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